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INSTITUTIONALIZING NAFTA
Michael Lusztig and Patrick James*
I. INTRODUCTION
HAT does it mean to institutionalize a trade agreement such as
NAFTA? We could take a very literal understanding. The
agreement, reached in 1992 and ratified one year later, created
a number of institutions. For example, NAFFA includes a commission
and secretariat to administer the agreement, as well as commissions on
labor cooperation and environmental cooperation. There is also a dis-
pute resolution bureaucracy. Moreover, we know from the history of the
European Union that trade agreements, through the logic of what is
known as functionalism, have the potential to deepen and widen. Put
differently, institutions created for narrow purposes can acquire an ever-
greater range of functions as part of their mandates (Mitrany 1975).
Formal, legal rules matter, of course. But they hardly are sufficient to
institutionalize an agreement. Students of constitutional politics have
made this point. Constitutional architecture is an important means to the
construction of the good society, but it is not an end in itself. History is
replete with examples of good constitutions and bad government, with
the German Weimar Republic as only the most notorious example. Con-
stitutions, in many ways analogous to international agreements in that
they represent an overarching set of paramount rules, are evaluated not
just on their substance, but also on "how the norms they embody first
gain acceptance and then retain legitimacy amid the political buffetings of
those 'who come after"' (Ferejohn, Rakove and Riley, 2001, 1). In other
words, constitutional success turns on what Ferejohn, Rakove, and Riley
(2001) deem the constitutional culture. The same logic applies to
NAFTA. For that agreement to operate as its framers envisioned, it must
be embraced by those "who come after." It must be supported by succes-
sor governments, whose commitment to the agreement will turn, given
the logic of liberal democratic rule, on the commitment of their
constituents.
The support of those "who came after" certainly was not guaranteed in
the early days of NAFTA. Mexico's president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari,
initiated the tripartite accord. So concerned was he with political back-
lash in the spring of 1990, that, even as he explored the prospect of conti-
*The authors would like to thank Alan M. Jacobs for his helpful comments. Lusztig
also thanks the John. G. Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist
University for assistance through a Colin Powell Fellowship.
552 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 11
nental free trade, Salinas took pains to deny that he sought to negotiate a
trade deal with the United States (Russell 1994, 335-36). In the fall of
1992, incoming President Bill Clinton came under strong pressure from
his own Democratic Party not to ratify the recently negotiated NAFTA
(Mayer 1998, ch.6). And in Canada, Liberal Party leader Jean Chr6tien,
on record as wishing to "tear up" NAFTA (Farnsworth 1993), became
prime minister just three months prior to the agreement's January 1, 1994
implementation date.
In the decade since NAFTA came into force, it has survived these early
political challenges. It is well entrenched in all three member nations;
none seriously has considered exercising its right to pull out of the agree-
ment.1 It is fair to claim that NAFTA has become institutionalized; its
original mandate enjoys the support of those who came after, regardless
of their previous disposition toward the agreement. This paper is dedi-
cated to supporting this claim, and to explaining how institutionalization
occurred.
NAFTA enjoys a modest degree of popular support in all three coun-
tries. At some level, support appears to be a function of national disloca-
tion costs. Thus, Americans are the most likely to consider themselves
winners from NAFTA, while Mexicans are most likely to view themselves
as losers (Ipsos-Reid 2002). On the other hand, in all three countries,
respondents are fairly evenly split with respect to their perceptions of the
costs and benefits of NAFTA (Table 1). Clearly support for NAFTA has
not become a "motherhood" issue in any of the member nations; by the
same token, there is no reason to believe that the agreement is
threatened by a popular backlash. As global economic conditions im-
prove, it is unlikely that NAIFTA will grow less popular in the coming
years.
Of course, while popular opinion is an important consideration in the
construction of what might be considered an institutional culture, or a
culture of NAFTA, to extend the constitutional analogy articulated previ-
ously, there is an even more important factor to consider when consider-
ing the threats posed by those who come after. Students of international
trade have long been aware that intensity of preference on issues of free
trade is neither evenly nor randomly distributed across the population.
Instead, free trade must be understood as an asymmetric good (Becker
1983; Baldwin 1989). The costs of free trade, manifest and concentrated,
are typically borne by producers who heretofore had enjoyed import pro-
1. Canada's Progressive Conservative (PC) leader, Peter MacKay, has promised to
"review" Canada's commitment to NAFFA. However, given that 75% of Progres-
sive Conservative supporters also support Canada's participation in NAFTA ac-
cording to a recent Ipsos-Reid poll, and given that MacKay's statements were
made in the context of his party's leadership convention, it is not likely that this
remark will herald a change in trade policy orientation for the party (McCarthy
2003). A more probable interpretation is that McKay intended to placate the




PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE BENEFITS OF NAFTA CANADA,
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 2002
Country NAFTA Hurt NAFTA Benefited Neither
Canada 38% 34% 17%
Mexico 33% 29% 33%
US 23% 34% 32%
Source: Ipsos-Reid (2002)
tection and/or direct subsidies (economists call these trade distortions
state-supplied rents). The benefits, though broad and usually greater in
the aggregate than the costs, are latent and dispersed among consumers.
Given this asymmetry, despite the aggregate economic benefits of
trade, "rent-seeking" producers can be expected to be far more politically
engaged over the issue of trade than will be consumers. These rent-seek-
ers represent an enormous challenge to the institutionalization of free
trade. The logic of asymmetry suggests that free trade deals will be hard
to negotiate, because elected politicians have an incentive to gratify con-
stituents with the greatest intensity of preference. Moreover, even if the
trade deal is signed and ratified, rent-seekers represent a threat to the
new institutional culture; they are another of the forces who come after.
To touch upon a point made earlier, the existence of a committed constit-
uency of rent-seekers provides a strong incentive for successor govern-
ments to gain political traction through opposition to the trade
arrangement. It is not surprising that many in Clinton's Democratic
Party urged him not to ratify NAFTA; we should not be shocked that
Chr6tien threatened to take Canada out of NAFTA; and we reasonably
might have expected the new Mexican government of Vicente Fox to dis-
tance itself from NAFTA.
The fact that North American free trade appears to have survived the
two greatest threats to the culture of NAFTA (rent-seekers and successor
governments) is perhaps the strongest evidence of the institutionalization
process. How did this institutionalization occur and what are the implica-
tions for other free trade agreements? The remainder of this paper is
dedicated to addressing these questions. The next section outlines a sim-
ple expected utility model to demonstrate how NAFTA altered the incen-
tive structures of both rent-seekers and successor governments. After
that, we apply the model to the three NAFTA member states. Finally, we
provide some ideas about the prospects for the extension of free trade
southward, possibly through the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) currently being negotiated.
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II. THE LIMITS OF RENT-SEEKING: AN EXPECTED
UTILITY MODEL
Given the threat posed by rent-seekers to the institutionalization of
free trade agreements, it is critical to understand the dynamics that can
neutralize this menace. The limits of rent-seeking model seeks to explain
conditions under which rent-seekers cease to stand as an obstacle to trade
liberalization, and indeed can actually become allies of liberalizing gov-
ernments. The model begins with the premise that rent-seekers do not
represent a monolithic population. Instead, we must conceptualize two
ideal-typical classifications of rent-seeker. The first is inflexible rent-
seekers. Inflexible rent-seekers are producers who are hopelessly ineffi-
cient. They tend to produce in sectors that suffer from comparative dis-
advantage; that is, in a free market environment, their production
resources would be invested more profitably in other sectors. Compara-
tive disadvantage could stem from insufficient supplies of capital or labor;
it could be a function of poor infrastructure in a nation or region; it could
be the result of insufficient technological sophistication; or finally, it
could be the product of climate or geography. Because markets tend to
be efficient, and inflexible rent-seekers are not, free market conditions
tend to spell doom for inflexible rent-seekers. They fall victim either to
foreign competition, or (where possible) to the incentive to move re-
sources into more productive sectors. In any case, inflexible rent-seekers
are defined as those who cannot survive without a generous helping of
state supplied rents in the form of import protection and/or subsidy.
By contrast, flexible rent-seekers seek state-supplied rents out of pref-
erence, not necessity. Such producers could adjust to meet the challenges
of global competition. But such adjustment is not easy. Typically it en-
tails product innovation, rationalization of product lines and personnel
and greater investments in research and development. To retain domestic
market shares, quality control has to improve; prices and (in the short-
term) profits must fall. To replace market-share lost at home, such flexi-
ble rent-seekers will have to find compensatory markets abroad. Add
uncertainty-producers cannot be absolutely sure that such adjustment
will succeed-and the costs of adjustment lead flexible rent-seekers, all
things being equal, to prefer the protectionist status quo.
Given their preference for the status quo, flexible rent-seekers have
every incentive to portray themselves as inflexible. Governments may
have ideas about who is competitive and who is not, but in many cases, it
is very difficult before the fact to gauge such things. However, once rent-
seekers recognize that the government is firm in its resolve to reduce
rents below a critical threshold (variant by producer), flexible rent-seek-
ers behave very differently than their inflexible cousins.
For inflexible rent-seekers, significant rent-reductions are a death sen-
tence. When rents are reduced below the critical threshold, and govern-
ments remain resolute, inflexible rent-seekers are culled from the market.
The hardest core of the protectionist lobby falls to the cruel reality of
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economic mortality. By contrast, under like circumstances, rather than
squander precious resources on a battle that is unlikely to be won, flexi-
ble rent-seekers will prefer to apply them towards the considerable ad-
justment costs outlined above. Faced with replacing domestic market
shares with foreign ones, flexible rent-seekers will become more export-
oriented. Many can be expected to reverse their trade policy preferences,
hoping (through the logic of reciprocity) that in lowering domestic rates
of import protection, they will gain greater access to foreign markets.
Moreover, because efficiency becomes more important in servicing for-
eign markets, reducing domestic import protection is beneficial because it
lowers the cost of imported factor inputs. Ironically, governments that
defy the preferences of flexible rent-seekers by imposing free trade upon
them may actually create long-term allies on the free trade front.
III. THE CASES
A. CANADA
Canada represents a fascinating example of the construction of an insti-
tutional culture for free trade. The two great threats to institutionaliza-
tion that we identified earlier - rent-seekers and successor governments -
have a long history of effective support for protectionism in Canada. In-
deed, Canadian rent-seekers enjoyed a century of industrial protectionist
hegemony, and the Liberal Party, which has formed the government in
Canada since 1993, shows strong and sustained commitment to a philoso-
phy of Canadian "left nationalism" since the mid-1960s. This left nation-
alism, characterized by antipathy to economic continentalism and
subordination of the market to the state in areas of key economic concern
for Canada, is undoubtedly what inspired Chr6tien's threat, in the au-
tumn of 1993, to tear up NAFTA. The Canadian case begins with the
conversion of industrial rent-seekers. Their conversion, which actually
served as a permissive condition for Canada's pursuit of NAFTA's fore-
runner, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFFA) of 1988, helps
to explain the commitment of the successor Liberal government to conti-
nental free trade.
Canada was born a free trading nation. The Elgin-Marcy (Reciprocity)
Treaty with the United States was abrogated the year prior to Confedera-
tion and, for the first decades of its national life, Canada sought to re-
establish free trade ties with its southern neighbor. By the late 1870s,
however, Canada's enthusiasm for free trade was greatly tempered, as
manifested in introduction of the National Policy. Designed to protect a
nascent manufacturing sector in Central Canada, the National Policy de-
veloped a rent-seeking constituency dedicated to the retention, even ex-
pansion, of industrial tariffs in Canada. The "free-trade election" of 1911
illustrates the success this constituency had in institutionalizing protec-
tionism. The trade deal negotiated between Canada and the United
States early in 1911 served merely to satisfy a long-standing Canadian
objective, advanced by both political parties, to liberalize continental ag-
2005]
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ricultural trade. Regardless of the benign impact on industrial protection,
however, industrial rent-seekers successfully mobilized to defeat the Lib-
eral Administration of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (for more on the politics of the
1911 free trade agreement and election see Skelton 1916; Ellis 1939;
Brown and Cook 1974). The fallout from the 1911 election saw removal
of continental free trade from the political agenda for over seventy
years.2
Free trade agreement or not, the massive U.S. market exerted a gravi-
tational pull that was difficult to resist and problematic to Canadian na-
tionalists. The palliative was multilateralism. Prior to World War II,
Britain and the Commonwealth was used as a multilateral counterweight
to U.S. economic influence. In the post-war era, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, now the World Trade Organization) served
the same purpose.
The GATT was especially valuable because, in its earliest years, it es-
chewed the so-called Swiss Formula (or comprehensive method) of re-
ducing import barriers in favor of a commodity-by-commodity formula
that grew out of the 1934 U.S. Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
(RTAA).3 Moreover, the early rounds of the GATT focused on tariff
reductions, permitting non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to remain well en-
trenched. As such, the early years of the GATT were a comfortable fit
for a country such as Canada, committed to striking a balance between
multilateralism and gratification of industrial rent-seekers. Things were
not to remain so comfortable.
As early as 1957, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was sufficiently
perplexed by Canada's reliance on the American market that he pro-
posed (absent any means to implement the plan, as it turned out) the
diversion of 15 percent of Canada's cross-border trade to Great Britain
(Diefenbaker 1976, 73-74). A more ambitious initiative was launched
under the auspices of the Trudeau government's Third Option. The Third
Option was an explicit rejection of two others: maintenance of the trade
policy status quo and pursuit of closer economic ties with the United
States. Instead, and consistent with Canada's long-standing trade objec-
tives, it sought to inject greater geographic diversity into Canada's foreign
economic orientation (Sharp 1972). The Third Option may have been
2. Some qualifications to this statement are necessary. Prime Minister McKenzie
King was receptive to the idea of pursuing another continental free trade deal as
early as the 1920s, and the two countries secretly negotiated an agreement immedi-
ately after the Second World War. However, King's acute political antennae per-
suaded him not to go forward with the deal (see McDiarmid 1946, 274; Reisman
1984, 39-40; Hart 2002, 143). Canada and the United States negotiated more mod-
est trade deals in 1935 and 1938 under the auspices of the US Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act (RTAA). The tariff concessions granted by Canada were modest,
and at least in part, were a response to Britain's own RTAA agreement with the
United States (Hart 2002, ch.4; Stone 1992, ch.2). Finally, the 1965 Auto Pact sig-
nificantly liberalized trade in automobiles and automotive parts.
3. The RTAA operated according to the unconditional most-favored-nations princi-
ple, whereby a commodity-specific tariff concession to one most-favored nation
was extended to all others.
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better planned than Diefenbaker's off-the-cuff initiative, but it proved no
more successful. In fact, its timing coincided nicely with the Tokyo
Round of the GATT, producing the following irony: Canada recommitted
itself to multilateralism at precisely the time that the Tokyo Round effec-
tively dismantled the system of protection created by the National Policy.
In turn, as we will demonstrate, this triggered the trade policy conversion
of industrial rent-seekers, which facilitated the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, which led to NAFTA, an accord that became institutional-
ized in Canada with the conversion of Trudeau's own Liberal Party to
continentalism.
The Tokyo Round negotiations took place from 1973-79. It was an am-
bitious round, which mandated the implementation of six codes designed
to reduce the use of industrial NTBs; it also obliged Canada to reduce
industrial tariffs by an average of 34 to 40 percent by 1987 (Canada 1983,
ch.7; Finlayson and Bertasi 1992, 30). More pertinently for present pur-
poses, the consequence of the Tokyo Round was to render the effective
rate of import protection insufficient to shelter rent-seeking industrialists.
There are a number of measures of effective rates of import protection;
they need not concern us here. The most meaningful measurement for
our purposes is that rent-seekers--both flexible and inflexible-behaved
as the limits of rent-seeking model predicts for a situation in which rents
fall below the critical threshold.
Inflexible rent-seekers, further weakened by the recession of the early
1980s, failed at a significant rate in the aftermath of the Tokyo Round.
For example, the number of total industrial bankruptcies and insolvencies
was 6,595 in 1980; the figure soared to 10,765 by 1982 (Canada 1985, 584-
586). By 1983, employment in manufacturing declined 11.5 percent from
its 1980 level, representing a net loss of 583,000 jobs (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development 1984, 28). More significantly,
flexible rent-seekers also behaved as predicted. The early 1980s wit-
nessed, for the first time in Canadian history, the mobilization of industri-
alists to lobby for liberalization of continental trade. Almost immediately
upon the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, the Business Council on Na-
tional Issues (BCNI),4 consisting of the chief executives of Canada's 150
largest corporations, began to lobby the Trudeau (and later Brian Mulro-
ney) government to pursue free trade with the United States. By 1983,
two of the staunchest opponents of liberalization during the 1970s, the
Canadian Manufacturers Association (CMA) 5 and the Canadian Federa-
tion of Independent Business (CFIB), 6 also became powerful advocates
of free trade. Finally, a number of other prominent confederations and
4. Now the Canadian Council of Chief Executives.
5. Now the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters (CME), the organization's mem-
bership accounts for roughly three-fourths of Canada's manufacturing output.
6. The CFIB is the largest direct-membership business confederation in Canada, with
over 100,000 members.
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sectoral organizations 7 publicly shifted their trade policy preferences (for
more on the conversion of flexible rent-seekers in Canada during the
early 1980s, see Lusztig 2004, ch.5).
This lobbying initiative was not in vain. In 1982, the Trudeau govern-
ment appointed a Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Devel-
opment Prospects for Canada, which ultimately recommended in favour
of continental free trade. More significantly, the lobbying effort helped
to convince a reluctant Brian Mulroney to take the enormous risk of be-
ing the first prime minister since Laurier to fight an election on the issue
of continental free trade.8 Ultimately, of course, the continental free
trade initiative was extended to create NAFTA, an agreement that was
supported strongly by the former (flexible) rent-seekers who had pushed
so hard for the 1988 agreement.
The other strong threat to the institutionalization of NAFTA was the
successor Liberal government. Jean Chr6tien's 1993 threat to tear up
NAFTA was not terribly surprising. As noted, the Liberal Party had long
been a locus of left nationalism in Canada. During the 1970s, and under
the auspices of the Third Option, the Trudeau government had imple-
mented barriers to foreign direct investment and trade through the For-
eign Investment Review Agency and the National Energy Programme.
Later, under the leadership of John Turner, the Liberals openly and defi-
antly opposed the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1988. Chr6tien,
a long-time member of Trudeau's cabinet, was hardly ideologically
predisposed towards free market economics. Moreover, as Hart puts it,
"he had fully accepted the critical Liberal position during the NAFTA
debate and had given full rein to its most vocal critics in his party ... "
(Hart 2003, 423). Yet, within three weeks of the 1993 election, the Chr6-
tien government dramatically reversed its field (Hart 2002, 397). Not
only did the Chr6tien government embrace NAFTA, but it subsequently
negotiated bilateral free trade accords with Israel, Chile, and Costa Rica,
and has taken a leading role in the FTAA negotiations.
What accounts for the Chr6tien government's dramatic turn around on
the issue of free trade? The answer helps explain the dynamics of institu-
tionalization of free trade deals. Political economists long have been
aware of the fact that free trade increases a country's aggregate wealth,
but skews the benefits in a politically suboptimal way. As noted, the big-
gest losers are the ones most able to create political unpleasantness, and
politicians have an incentive to listen to those who make the most fuss.
On the other hand, absent such political unpleasantness, politicians' in-
7. These organizations are the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Canadian Associa-
tion of Toy Manufacturers, Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, Machinery
and Equipment Manufacturers' Association of Canada, Rubber Association of Ca-
nada, and the steel industry.
8. Space does not permit an adequate discussion of the politics of the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement. For more on the free trade lobby by flexible rent-seekers
see Cameron 1986; Langille 1987; Newman 1998. For more on Mulroney's conver-
sion to free trade see Lusztig 1996, ch.4; Lusztig and James 1996.
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centive structures can change. Regardless of their ideological orientation,
elected politicians have a dominant preference for strong economic per-
formance (Lindblom 1977). A strong economy is permissive; it permits
fiscally conservative governments to lower taxes or liberal ones to raise
spending. During good economic times, voters tend to be happier, and
happy voters typically reward incumbent politicians with re-election
(Lewis-Beck 1986). As such, all things being equal, incumbent govern-
ments, even of the left, may prefer the efficiency of the marketplace over
their ideological mandate to rely on the state as an instrument of resource
allocation.
Of course, not every incumbent government rallies to the free trade
cause simply because there are economic rewards to reap. By contrast,
most Canadian governments have operated in an environment in which
rent-seekers were the ultimate arbiters of appropriate foreign economic
policy. In other words, the extent to which Canadian protectionism since
the 1960s was driven by ideology, as opposed to the pragmatism of grati-
fying the most committed political constituency on the issue, is unclear.
More certain is that when the rent-seeking community changed sides dur-
ing the 1980s, they removed an enormous obstacle to liberalization of
trade. Governments, both Conservative and Liberal, quickly determined
that they could enjoy the benefits of increased economic performance
without suffering the attendant political backlash that, even a few years
previous, would have been inevitable.
In sum, the ideological "jujitsu" practiced by both major political par-
ties in Canada, upon the conversion to free trade by flexible rent-seekers,
goes a long way towards explaining the institutionalization of NAFTA in
Canada.
B. THE UNITED STATES
The case can be made that the United States represents the country in
which NAFTA is least institutionalized. The massive 1999 anti-globaliza-
tion protest in Seattle speaks to this, as does the thin margin with which
Bush won trade promotion authority (TPA) from Congress in 2002.9 In
part, resistance to NAFTA, and hemispheric free trade in general, is
grounded in trade unions, which in turn are a key constituency of the
Democratic Party.10
9. TPA allows the president to negotiate trade deals, within a prescribed time frame,
subject to congressional oversight that is limited to acceptance or rejection of the
agreement as presented to Congress.
10. Canadian trade unions also are opposed to globalization and continental free
trade. On the other hand, rank and file union members are not overwhelmingly
hostile to NAFTA. The 2000 Canadian National Election survey, for example,
asked respondents if they believed that: "Overall, free trade with the U.S. has been
good for the Canadian economy." Of respondents who were in a union, or lived
with a union member, 59 percent either strongly or somewhat agreed with the
statement, while only 33 percent strongly or somewhat disagreed.
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On the other hand, even in the Democratic Party, opposition to
NAFTA is not universal. In the context of the January 2004 Democratic
Party primaries, Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg's survey of Dem-
ocratic voters in the politically attenuated states of Iowa, New Hamp-
shire, and South Carolina found that roughly half supported NAFTA
(Brooks 2004). Moreover, even among Democratic presidential hopefuls
seeking to rally the base in anticipation of the primaries, only fringe can-
didate Dennis Kucinich vowed to pull the United States out of NAFTA.11
Indeed, the reality is that too much has been invested, both in terms of
foreign policy with Mexico (and other Latin American countries), 12 and
in terms of business, for the United States to consider abrogating its
NAFTA responsibilities. As with Canada, we find that the business com-
munity appears to be driving the institutionalization of NAFTA in the
United States. In other words, as with Canada, former rent-seekers ap-
pear to have shaped the parameters of political contestation; business
support for NAFTA has limited political opposition to the agreement.
Uslaner (2000) and Lake (1988) help explain an important element of
the institutionalization process. Uslaner points out that, at least since the
RTAA, free trade has been the policy choice of winners, operationalized
as the party that wins the presidential election. His argument is that eco-
nomic prosperity and political success generate a symbiotic relationship.
Candidates with a stronger free market orientation are more likely to
have a good economic track record and hence are more likely to be en-
trusted with control of the executive branch. While there have been pro-
tectionist episodes since the 1930s, it is no exaggeration to say that every
president since (and including) Franklin D. Roosevelt has been a free
trader. Lake (1988) suggests that the free-trading orientation of presi-
dents is reinforced by the fact that the so-called "foreign policy execu-
tive" is insulated from the effects of rent-seeking special interests to a far
greater extent than is Congress. The fact that the foreign policy executive
is charged with serving the interests of the nation as a whole, rather than
a comparatively narrow constituency base, helps explain the distinction.
Moreover, for reasons we discussed above, the "interests of the nation"
tend to be difficult to distinguish from the preferences of big business
(Lindblom 1977). In short, the free-trade bias built into U.S. trade policy
since the RTAA has helped institutionalize NAFTA and other major free
trade initiatives (such as the WTO). Trade may not be universally em-
braced-protectionist pockets of Congress can be expected to persist, and
a number of inefficient industries such as steel will continue to seek pro-
tection-but so strong is the free trade orientation of U.S. presidents that
11. Richard Gephardt is a long-time opponent of free trade and NAFTA in particular.
Howard Dean has deemed NAFTA flawed and in need of revision, although he is
also on record as being a strong supporter of the agreement.
12. The Bush Administration has used its TPA to further negotiations on the proposed
FTAA. In addition, it has negotiated a bilateral trade deal with Chile, and a free
trade zone (Central American Free Trade Agreement) with El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
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even a Democrat like Clinton could ratify NAFTA and launch the FTAA
process.
Once again our interest is drawn to a watershed event in a country's
trade policy that altered the trade policy orientation of political parties
and industrial rent-seekers alike. The RTAA can best be understood as
the forerunner of the contemporary trade promotion authority (TPA)
process. 13 Under the terms of that act, Congress loaned its tariff-making
authority, for clearly defined (usually three or four year) periods, to the
executive branch, allowing the latter to negotiate reciprocal trade agree-
ments without the necessity of congressional oversight. More specifically,
the president was authorized to enter into bilateral accords that reduced
(or increased) U.S. tariffs by as much as 50 percent from their base-line
levels. In this way, Congress-cognizant of its own propensity to gratify
rent-seeking interests-was able to bind its own hands and insulate the
trade policy process from rent-seeking pressures. Moreover, because, as
noted, the RTAA operated according to the unconditional most-favored
nations principle, each trade deal represented an iterative reduction to
aggregate tariff rates applicable to each of America's principal trading
partners (for more on the RTAA see Brenner 1978; Rhodes 1993; Gilli-
gan 1997).
Between 1934 and 1947 the U.S. entered into reciprocal trade deals
with twenty-seven countries. The cumulative effect of so many tariff re-
ductions was significant. As one study noted of the period 1930 to 1939:
"Never before had the direction of global trade relations moved so
broadly and deeply toward reduced trade barriers" (Cohen, Paul, and
Blecker 2003, 34). For commodities covered by these twenty-seven
agreements, average ad valorem duties fell by roughly 44 percent, or al-
most the maximum amount permitted under the terms of the RTAA
(United States 1948, 3: tab. 2).
The effects of the RTAA represented a sea change in the United
States, and indeed global, industrial trade policy. 14 Passage of the RTAA
was a perilous risk for the Roosevelt Administration (see Hull 1948;
Lusztig 1996), as rent-seeking industries lined up squarely in opposition
to it (see Ferguson 1984; Frieden 1988). As was the case in Canada, when
examining the fate of inflexible rent-seekers it is difficult to distinguish
the effects of the RTAA from those of the prevailing Great Depression.
But our concern is with flexible rent-seekers. Here the evidence is
clearer. First, U.S. industrial exports rose sharply in the latter half of the
13. Formerly known as fast-track authority, TPA permits the executive branch to ne-
gotiate trade deals that lower both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Congressional
oversight is limited to passing implementing legislation that is immune from
amendment. Congress must vote either to accept or reject the agreement as
negotiated.
14. The RTAA was not restricted to industrial goods. On the other hand, the large
network of agricultural subsidies and supports set up under the auspices of the
New Deal Agricultural Adjustment Act limited the maneuverability of US trade
negotiators (see Verdier 1994, esp. 188). To this day, agricultural trade remains far
less open than does trade in industrial goods.
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1930s. While this might be expected in the wake of deals that permitted
increased access to overseas markets, it is worth noting that exports in-
creased markedly to countries with which the United States had not en-
tered into reciprocal trade deals (Schnietz 2003). This suggests that U.S.
producers had begun taking steps to become more internationally com-
petitive. Second, evidence of a change in trade policy preferences can be
tracked through congressional testimony of business leaders during the
triennial renewals of the RTAA. While business leaders had overwhelm-
ingly opposed the RTAA and its first renewal in 1937, by 1940, there was
a marked shift. By a margin of more than two-to-one, non-labor and
non-agricultural interests testifying before Congress in person or via writ-
ten brief supported renewal of the RTAA (Brenner 1978, 355-65; for
more on the changing tide of business preferences during this period see
Gilligan 1997). Finally, we have at least some survey data to support the
claim that flexible rent-seekers shifted their trade policy preferences. By
1954,15 executives of U.S. firms favored lowering domestic tariffs to rais-
ing them by a factor of 7 to 1 (Bauer, Keller and de la Sola Pool, and
Dexter 1955; see also polls in Saturday Review (1954) and Dun's Review
and Modern Industry (1962)).
The transformation of flexible rent-seekers in the United States has led
to a robust and strong preference for open markets among industrial pro-
ducers. While pockets of protectionism still exist (the steel and textile
industries are excellent examples), there can be little doubt that U.S. bus-
iness retains a strong preference for free trade (Milner 1988; Gilligan
1997). The transformation of industrial rent-seekers was accompanied by
a similar trade policy shift by the Republican Party, the traditional party
of protectionism. While, as noted, the Democratic Party has become
much less wedded to trade liberalization, the Democrats hardly can be
characterized as a protectionist party. Indeed, it would be fair to charac-
terize Herbert Hoover as the last protectionist president of either stripe.
Given this fact, despite America's ambivalence towards embracing the
FTAA, it seems quite clear that NAFTA is in no danger from those who
came after.
C. MEXICO
In no country was NAFTA deemed more radical than it was in Mexico.
Both Canada and the United States, despite protectionist histories, were
thoroughly liberal countries in the early 1990s. Both boasted relatively
free markets and political systems. While CUFIFA and NAFTA were im-
portant trade policy changes in those countries, they hardly constituted
regime change. Yet regime change is precisely what NAFTA represented
in Mexico. Not only did the agreement cap a decade-long shift to free
15. This poll appears to be the first taken on business attitudes to free trade since a
1939 Roper poll, which asked almost the same question as the one taken by Bauer,
Keller, and de la Sola Pool that found far more modest support for free trade
among business leaders (Fortune 1939).
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market economics in Mexico, something that had heretofore not existed,
it also accompanied, if not stimulated, radical democratic reform that ulti-
mately produced the 2000 presidential election of Vincente Fox Quesada.
The 2000 election was the first in over seventy years not captured by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), or its forerunner.
Seven decades of one-party rule was the product of more than merely
exceptionally good government. The PRI retained its dominance through
subversion of the liberal democratic process known as authoritarian cor-
poratism. Under this system, key social sectors (principally labor, peas-
ants, and the lower middle class) were obliged to organize into
hierarchically structured "peak associations." Leaders of these peak as-
sociations were part of the ruling elite, and maintained control of their
organizations, which included delivering the political support of their
constituents to the PRI through a system of positive (bribery) and nega-
tive (thuggery) incentives (see Purcell and Purcell 1980). The business
sector, less vulnerable to such crude organizational tactics, was controlled
through its dependence on the narcotic of protectionism.
As in most of Latin America, Mexican protectionism took the form of
import substituting industrialization (ISI) (see Hirschman 1968; Izquierdo
1964). ISI is an attractive short-term development strategy that contains
inherent long-term limitations. It is enticing because it provides a means
for very late industrializers to modernize their economies in spite of in-
herent non-competitiveness in the global marketplace. ISI operates ac-
cording to three distinct phases. The early phase, which occurs in the
wake of the construction of a formidable barrier to import penetration in
the industrial sector, sees the emergence of indigenous manufacturing en-
terprises, stimulated by the market opportunities born of limited foreign
competition as well as generous state-supplied subsidies and loans.16 The
second, exuberant, phase witnesses an explosion of economic growth. In
Mexico, the Mexican economy expanded at an average rate of 6 percent
per year between 1950 and 1972 (Ramirez 1993, 174). Of course, there is
an inherent artificiality to these figures, insofar as they were achieved in
the absence of foreign competition. While that does not make the wealth
created any less real, it is vital to note that exuberant-phase firms had
little incentive to become globally competitive. Wealth was created on
the back of limited research and development or innovation of product
lines. Consumer goods-overpriced, lacking in quality, and reliant on ob-
solete technology-had limited attraction to overseas consumers. Under
these conditions, the exhaustion phase of ISI becomes inevitable. Char-
acterized by slowing profits, decreased investment, and low growth rates,
the exhaustion phase sees the economy saddled with a mass of inefficient
firms dependent upon state-supplied rents for their very survival.
16. In 1940, just prior to the introduction of ISI, there were roughly 13,510 industrial
firms in Mexico. By the end of the easy phase, circa 1950, there were approxi-
mately 74,252 such firms (Story 1986, 19).
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ISI exhaustion manifested itself in a number of ways in Latin America.
In Chile, it led to revolution, in Brazil (although here the connection is
less clear) to a military coup. In Mexico, ISI exhaustion coincided with
the oil crisis and the apparently fortuitous discovery of new oil deposits in
that country. These deposits, along with generous lending practices by
U.S. banks eager to lend out the glut of "petrodollar" reserves generated
by the explosion of wealth in oil producing countries, provided Mexico
with the means to postpone the reality of having to deal with ISI exhaus-
tion. The administration of President Jos6 Lopez-Portillo, recognizing
the problem, did announce that it would seek membership in the GATT.
However, the government backed down in the face of overwhelming op-
position from rent-seeking special interests (see Story 1982).
By 1982, the costs of Mexico's unwillingness to restructure its economy
in the wake of ISI exhaustion became all too manifest. The precipitous
decline in world oil prices and the concomitant tightening of capital mar-
kets deprived Mexico of vital sources of income. Compounding the prob-
lem was the fact that many of Mexico's loans were short-term. When
those came due, it became apparent that Mexico, which struggled in vain
to support the peso, would be obliged to default on its debts (for a more
detailed analysis see Wyman 1983; Lustig 1992). The resulting crisis,
which lasted for the remainder of the decade, brought with it hyperinfla-
tion and massive capital flight. More pertinently, for present purposes,
the crisis robbed subsequent Mexican governments of policy maneuvera-
bility. Henceforth, key economic decisions largely would be in the hands
of multilateral lending institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Indeed, international lenders insisted upon
neo-liberal economic reforms, such as lowering spending, liberalizing
trade, and joining and conforming to the GATT (Lustig 1992).
There were a number of casualties of Mexico's economic crisis of the
1980s. One was corporatism. There were simply insufficient resources to
maintain the vast network of political support for the PRI. Another casu-
alty was inflexible rent-seekers. Ironically, it was the demise of corporat-
ism and inflexible rent-seekers that opened the door for NAFTA and
helps explain its institutionalization.
That inflexible rent-seekers were casualties of the twin disasters of se-
vere depression and forcible weaning from the public purse is no surprise.
Even in the most dynamic industrial region, Monterrey, the effects were
severe. The Monterrey Manufacturers' Association, for example, claimed
to lose over 3,700 members between 1987 and 1992 (The Economist
1992). On the other hand, even in the midst of this devastation, new life
was being created. During the same period, the Monterrey Manufactur-
ers' Association saw roughly 5,000 new members join the organization
(Tirado 1998, 185). In fact, it was this sort of wholesale shift in the com-
position of the business community that helped doom the corporatist po-
litical structure. As inflexible rent-seekers were rationalized out of the
market, they were replaced by firms better able to meet the harsh reali-
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ties of global competition. During the second half of the 1980s, firms that
survived the economic crisis (new firms and flexible rent-seekers) became
far less wedded to the paternal statism that had characterized the corpo-
ratist era. Many businessmen shifted their political allegiances away from
the PRI and towards the more free market National Action Party (PAN).
At the same time, the government's financial predicament precluded
spending the money necessary to keep other clients of the corporatist
arrangement satisfied, and the PRI suffered defection of workers and
peasants to the new Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) (Klesner
1993).
When Salinas came to power, following what was almost certainly a
fraudulent 1988 election victory, he faced economic crisis and defection
of partisan support on both left and right. His solution, pioneered by
U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt fifty years previously (see Lusztig
1996, ch.3), was classic welfare economics. To recapture the support of
his clientele constituency, Salinas created a broad network of welfare
state spending known as the Program of National Solidarity
(PRONASOL). To fund the enterprise, and to win back support of the
newly free trading business community, he undertook his boldest
stroke-he turned his back on over 100 years of nationalist antipathy to-
wards the United States and gambled that NAFTA would attract the in-
vestment necessary to rebuild the economy.
We began this section by suggesting that NAFTA was a far more radi-
cal proposition in Mexico than it had been in Canada and the United
States because it was a departure not just from the country's traditional
trade policy, but also served to stimulate a regime-shift in favor of liber-
alism. By helping to usher in liberalism, NAFTA may well have un-
leashed the forces necessary for its own institutionalization. This is not to
overstate the claim. Mexico is hardly a model liberal democracy; corrup-
tion is rampant, and one decade is scarcely enough time for a wide scale
cultural shift to have taken hold. Nor has the long, slow process of re-
building the economy moved beyond the point of hopeful signs for the
future. NAFTA is not a magic bullet. But it is an important brick in the
wall of Mexico's quest to remake its political economy.
NAFTA was baptized by fire. Its immediate aftermath witnessed
armed rebellion in the southern state of Chiapas, the assassination of the
PRI's presidential candidate, and a severe economic crisis borne of the
government's inability to support the peso. Yet NAFTA also witnessed
the extension of liberal principles beyond the economic market. Under
the final president of the PRI dynasty, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon,
reforms were undertaken to empower Congress, weaken the power of the
president (who no longer chooses his successor as party leader, which for
the PRI meant the president as well), and most importantly permitting
free and fair elections (Rubio 1998). The first tangible fruits of this lib-
eral revolution were harvested in July 2000, when PAN candidate Fox
won the presidential election.
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While there is still ambivalence among the Mexican public towards
NAFTA, the agreement appears to be well protected against those who
come after. The Mexican business community is wedded strongly to free
trade. As early as 1990, only one of Mexico's five largest business confed-
erations was still opposed to trade liberalization. In the immediate wake
of NAFTA, even that recalcitrant organization had come on board (see
Lusztig 2004, ch.4). 17 Mexican business organizations continue to support
the expansion of trade liberalization through the FTAA (Ortiz 2000).
The Fox Administration, fighting against congressional sclerosis and hav-
ing possibly squandered a golden opportunity to capitalize on President
Bush's unprecedented interest in America's southern neighbor by its
stance on Iraq, remains resolute in its pro-trade position. Indeed, since
NAFTA, under both PRI and PAN, Mexico has demonstrated its commit-
ment to trade liberalization by completing trade deals with Bolivia
(1995); Costa Rica (1995); Colombia and Venezuela (Group of Three)
(1995); Nicaragua (1998); Chile (1999); the European Union (2000),
Israel (2000); the European Fair Trade Association (2001); and Honduras,
Guatemala and El Salvador (the Northern Triangle) (2001).
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper set out to investigate institutionalization of NAFTA in par-
ticular, with some interest in relating our findings to trade agreements in
general. The fundamental result is that institutionalization of NAFTA is
the rule rather than the exception, with the sum of internal and external
forces after liberalization always pointing toward such policies being sus-
tained in the future among the countries concerned. This is true, moreo-
ver, even when those who had opposed a trade agreement re-take power.
Free trade is preserved in all instances-an interesting norm that may, for
various reasons, approach the status of a social scientific law. In this con-
cluding section we revisit each of the cases individually and finish up with
some general observations.
Canada's march toward more liberal trade policies, culminating in
NAFTA, can be traced most directly to external forces, namely, the To-
kyo Round and U.S. pressure to open its economic borders. Thus Ca-
nada, a classic middle power, faced imperatives toward trade
liberalization as the twentieth century moved into its final decades. After
CUFTA and NAFrA, politicians disposed toward protectionism regained
power, but found a different set of forces when they arrived back in of-
17. The last holdout for protectionism was CANACINTRA (National Chamber of
Manufacturing Industry), which consists of mostly small to medium-sized firms.
The other major confederations are: CONCAMIN (National Confederation of In-
dustrial Chambers);CONCANACO (National Confederation of Chambers of
Commerce, which like CONCAMIN represents larger firms); COPARMEX (Em-
ployers' Confederation of the Republic of Mexico, representing employers in the
industrial, agricultural and retail sectors); and the CCE (Business Coordinating
Council, an omnibus business organization consisting of representatives of other
business confederations and with roughly 1.25 million affiliates).
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fice. For a host of reasons they simply could not undo NAFTA. First,
external forces still had the same liberal profile and taking on the United
States in particular would be a formidable task. Second, the natural allies
of NAFTA's repeal had been weakened or destroyed, as expected, by the
very policies they had opposed so vigorously in the past. In sum, the
post-1993 Canadian government effectively institutionalized NAFTA by
its failure to make efforts toward a renewed protectionism. At this point,
either the Martin government or whatever replaces it must deal with the
same reality-a transformed economic landscape in which protectionism
necessarily resides in a "Jurassic Park" with other moribund economic
policies from the past.
Interesting, by comparison, is the essentially internal set of forces that
take precedence in the United States and eventually produce NAFTA.
The worlds' leading state becomes more liberal in economic terms as the
century progresses, with the turning point reached in the Great Depres-
sion. The utter failure of protectionism became understood by the vast
majority of the business and political elite by the time the grim events of
the 1930s had played themselves out in World War II and the collapse of
empires around the world. Reinforcing the trend toward liberal trade
policies was the imperial era of the presidency, the branch of government
least prone to pressure from rent-seeking coalitions. Thus, after World
War II, the United States took the lead in various rounds of trade liberali-
zation that ultimately pointed in the direction of bilateral, continental,
and perhaps even hemispheric integration. While the full story of the
FTAA remains to be told, and protectionist undercurrents have stirred
the waters of U.S. trade policy from time to time, the United States is a
state in which relatively open trade relations reached the point of becom-
ing institutionalized some time ago. NAFTA represents a continuation of
this effect.
Mexico is the harshest test for the argument that institutionalization
will ensue after a more liberal trade regime such as NAFTA is imple-
mented. Unlike the United States or Canada, Mexico is a weak state in
economic terms and suffers from overpopulation, corruption, and other
factors that would tend to make one wary regarding highly specific pre-
dictions about its future policies. Furthermore, it remained dedicated to
an economy of ISI for decades. In spite of such impediments, NAFTA
and the mind set it represents now hold a firm position in Mexico and
may be described as institutionalized. The primary reasons here are in-
ternational; put simply, Mexico cannot afford to regress into protection-
ism when its future depends so directly on economic institutions such as
the IMF and the U.S.-led order within North America. Mexico lacks the
power to confront either its elephantine neighbor or major world organi-
zations directly. Furthermore, a "learning curve' from the failure of ISI,
along with an altered economic infrastructure, is present at least to some
degree. In other words, if protectionism is associated by experience with
certain failure, and institutionalization of liberal trade policies is linked to
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some possibility of success, then the latter virtually wins out by default.
This might not be a bad way of describing how things stand in Mexico
today.
Overall, NAFTA can be described as institutionalized across the board.
It is interesting to consider that result in the context of variation among
the three states, which differ from each other along very salient character-
istics such as size of population, military power, political culture, and a
range of others. The institutionalization of NAFTA among its diverse
members suggests that the model of rent seeking introduced earlier in
this paper may have general relevance. No matter what situation exists in
more specific politico-economic terms, trade liberalization, which weak-
ens or destroys rent-seeking coalitions, is sustained even after its oppo-
nents regain power. In closing, it is fair to say that the opponents, once
regaining office, are looking out the window at a world different than
what they had know-a world effectively transformed by NAFTA.
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